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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Nearly one in four women1 will become a victim of sexual
assault while attending college.2 It is estimated that over 100,000
students each year “are too intoxicated to know whether they con-
1. Throughout this Note, I will refer to the survivor and perpetrator in gender-
neutral terms to reflect the fact that not all survivors of sexual assault are women and
not all perpetrators are men. This includes the editing of source material to be gender-
neutral except where it would be intellectually dishonest to do so, such as in survey data.
2. Kay Hartwell Hunnicutt, Women and Violence on Campus, in VIOLENCE ON
CAMPUS 149, 152 (Allan M. Hoffman et al. eds., 1998).
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sented to sexual intercourse” 3 and more than 70,000 students a
year are “[survivors] of alcohol-related sexual assault or acquaintance
rape.” 4 Responding to the problem, Congress passed several pieces
of legislation that required colleges to address the issue.5 Colleges,
in response to the problem and the federal legislation, developed com-
prehensive sexual assault policies and procedures,6 including the addi-
tion of student disciplinary regulations proscribing sexual assault.7
Yet even with the addition of these policies and procedures,
eighty-three percent of sexual assaults go unreported to campus
officials.8 One reason, as studies have shown, is that a substantial
number of survivors do not label the incident as sexual assault, even
when the experience complies with the technical definition.9 Addi-
tionally, even with a written student disciplinary regulation proscrib-
ing sexual assault, perpetrators do not define their behavior as the
commission of sexual assault,10 and as a result, continue to believe
the behavior is appropriate.11
The campus environment plays a significant role in creating
confusion about which acts constitute sexual assault. College is an
exciting and often confusing time for students.12 This new experience
3. William DeJong, The Impact of Alcohol on Campus Life, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS 101, 104 (David R. Karp & Thom Allena eds., 2004).
4. Id. at 104-05.
5. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS:
WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT 1 (2005), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE] (noting that
these laws require colleges “to notify students about crime on campus, publicize their
prevention and response policies, maintain open crime logs, and ensure sexual assault
victims their basic rights”).
6. See HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: HOW AMERICA’S
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND viii (2002), available at http://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196676.pdf (noting that colleges “have made substantial strides
in the direction of developing explicit sexual assault policies”).
7. Id. (noting “that most campuses . . . d[o] articulate some definition of rape and
other forms of sexual assault”).
8. Bonnie S. Fisher, et al., Crime and Sexual Victimization on College and University
Campuses: Ivory Towers or Dangerous Places?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON THE COLLEGE
CAMPUS, supra note 3, at 217, 227.
9. See KARJANE ET AL., supra note 6, at vii (explaining that “even though the incident
is legally a criminal offense, [survivors] do not call their victimization a ‘rape’ ”).
10. See MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ & WALTER S. DEKESEREDY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON THE
COLLEGE CAMPUS: THE ROLE OF MALE PEER SUPPORT 79 (1997) (noting that the perpetu-
ation of “rape myths” leads to a “very narrow definition” of sexual assault).
11. See THE CAMPUS COMMUNITY CONFRONTS SEXUAL ASSAULT: INSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES AND CAMPUS AWARENESS 3 (Juneau Mahan Gary ed., 1994) [hereinafter CAMPUS
COMMUNITY] (noting that perpetrators will not change their behaviors until “they examine
and label them as aggressive and violent”).
12. See University Counseling Center, The George Washington University,
Understanding the Transition to College, http://gwired.gwu.edu/counsel/Resourcesfor
ParentsFacultyStaff/ParentServices (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (noting that “college will
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is defined by coed dorms, near constant socializing that often in-
volves alcohol, and the ability to retreat to a private room with no
adult supervision.13 The environment creates a socialization process
where appropriate behavior is defined by the actions of peers, par-
ticularly when it comes to sexual behavior.14 Given this environment,
sexual assaults on campus are often committed by someone the sur-
vivor knows15 and, in most incidents, at least one individual is under
the influence of alcohol.16
This Note will seek to convince college officials of the need to
more precisely define the behavior that constitutes sexual assault
under their student disciplinary regulations. This action is necessary
both as a legal and policy matter. As a legal matter, the ambiguity
within the text of the regulation itself may give rise to potential legal
challenges to the regulation under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
As a policy matter, a more precise definition is needed to facilitate
the labeling of certain acts as sexual assault from the viewpoint of
both the perpetrator and the survivor, which will encourage more
survivors to report their victimization and discourage perpetrators
from ever engaging in such conduct. This Note will explain the history
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, its application to student disci-
plinary regulations, and will propose a definition of sexual assault for
use in a student disciplinary regulation proscribing such conduct.
I. VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND APPLICATION TO
STUDENT DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS
The void-for-vagueness doctrine “is embodied in the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.”17 The doctrine is
used to ensure that an individual has “fair notice” and an “adequate
warning” of the fact “that sanctions are attached to [the] conduct he
likely be a period of intellectual stimulation and growth, career exploration and develop-
ment, increased autonomy, self-exploration and discovery, and social involvement”).
13. See Fisher et al., supra note 8, at 225.
14. See KATHLEEN A. BOGLE, HOOKING UP: SEX, DATING, AND RELATIONSHIPS ON
CAMPUS 74 (2008) (explaining that college students’ perception of appropriate sexual
behavior is largely based on the “norms for their peer group” because “students define
their own sexual behavior relative to others, particularly other students of the same sex”).
15. See Connie J. Kirkland, Program Case Study: Campus-Based Sexual Assault
Services — On the Cutting Edge, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS,
supra note 3, at 239, 245 (noting that “[o]ne of the biggest dilemmas is reporting someone
the [survivor] knows”).
16. See Michele A. Paludi & Darlene C. DeFour, Sexual Harassment of Students: The
Hidden Campus Violence, in VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note 2, at 187 (noting that
“[m]any acts of sexual violence on college campuses involve the use of alcohol”).
17. Woodis v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1998).
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contemplates.”18 The doctrine also prevents those government offi-
cials charged with enforcing a regulation or statute from doing so in
an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.19 The doctrine has been applied
to criminal statutes,20 civil regulations,21 and though courts initially
expressed reluctance, the void-for-vagueness doctrine has become
one of the tools students have used to vindicate and protect their due
process rights.22
A. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, though in existence since
common law, has taken many forms and has based its foundation
on a variety of authorities. At common law, courts refused to enforce
laws that were found to be “too uncertain to be applied.” 23 In early
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court invalidated unclear laws
based on a separation of powers doctrine.24 There is also Supreme
Court precedent for invalidating criminal convictions because the
accused “was denied his right to be informed ‘of the nature and cause
of the accusation’ as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 25 Over
time, however, the void-for-vagueness doctrine cemented its foundation
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses.26
Though the void-for-vagueness doctrine was originally applied solely
to criminal statutes, specifically the description of prohibited con-
duct,27 the doctrine has been extended to other areas, including the
level of punishment that may be imposed for a criminal conviction28
and civil regulations.29
18. Note, Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus, 80 YALE L.J. 1261, 1265-66
(1971).
19. Id. at 1266.
20. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 97 (3d ed. 2000).
21. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158 (1974) (finding that the regulations
governing the process by which to dismiss a federal employee, a civil action, were not
invalid for vagueness).
22. See Sill v. Pa. State Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1972) (noting that the void-
for-vagueness doctrine “extends to rules regulating the conduct of students in educational
institutions chartered or supported by the state”); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163,
168 (7th Cir. 1969) (“To the extent that Esteban v. Central Missouri State College . . .
refuses to apply standards of vagueness . . . required of universities by the Fourteenth
Amendment we decline to follow it.”).
23. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 97.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390 (1926); LAFAVE, supra note 20,
at 97.
27. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 97.
28. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 495 (1948) (noting that the vagueness
extended to the statutorily required penalties).
29. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158 (1974) (finding that the regulations
governing the process by which to dismiss a federal employee, a civil action, were not
invalid for vagueness).
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The accepted standard by which to evaluate a statute or regula-
tion under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as articulated in Connally,
is that a statute or regulation should be declared void when the lan-
guage is so vague that “men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” 30 The void-for-
vagueness doctrine uses three general lenses through which to ap-
proach a specific regulation or statute. First, it examines whether
the statute or regulation gives fair notice to individuals possibly sub-
ject to it.31 Second, it considers whether the statute or regulation pro-
vides adequate guidance to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.32 Third, in cases where First Amendment protections
are implicated, it questions whether the statute or regulation pro-
vides sufficient breadth to permit free expression.33
Under the first lens, a court must consider whether an individual
was given fair notice of the standard of conduct proscribed by the
statute or regulation.34 Fair notice, however, is not simply deter-
mined by the language itself, but can be given where a well-settled
meaning in the common law, court decisions, or a general societal
understanding exists.35
Under the second lens, a court must consider whether the statute
or regulation allows for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.36
Courts are generally concerned about selective enforcement by the in-
dividuals, typically prosecutors, or government agencies charged with
enforcing the law.37 Courts are also concerned that a vague regulation
will leave it to “the arbitrary whim” of an official to determine what “in
fact constitutes” a violation based on “his own subjective opinion.” 38
Under the third lens, courts are concerned not only with statutes
or regulations that trample on protected forms of speech and expres-
sion, but also with laws that have the potential for a chilling effect.39
Courts will examine the statute or regulation to determine if the law
sweeps too broadly by bringing protected speech within its grasp.40
30. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
31. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 98.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 98-99.
36. Id. at 98.
37. Id. at 101.
38. Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114, 117-18 (D. Conn. 1970).
39. See LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 102 (addressing the possibility that the state may
get away with “more inhibitory regulation than it has a constitutional right to impose”
because people would rather obey the regulations than run the risk of “erroneous
constitutional judgment”).
40. Id.
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B. Judicial Intervention into Student Disciplinary Procedures
During the early years of void-for-vagueness challenges, courts
were generally very reluctant to apply the doctrine to student dis-
ciplinary regulations.41 Courts and society viewed colleges as “self-
sustaining entit[ies] that w[ere] capable of regulating” themselves.42
As such, courts were generally unlikely to intervene.43 This reluctance
was based on the view that because of “the particular nature of aca-
demic life, universities have an inherent power to discipline students
and that this power may be exercised without the necessity of relying
on specific rules of conduct.” 44 This reluctance to intervene extended
beyond the void-for-vagueness doctrine and included other constitu-
tional due process protections because courts believed that student
disciplinary procedures “should not be required to conform to federal
processes of criminal law, which are far from perfect, and designed for
circumstances and ends unrelated to the academic community.” 45
C. Student Disciplinary Regulations and the First Amendment
One area of student discipline in which courts were more willing
to intervene involved student disciplinary regulations that “touch[ed]
upon First Amendment rights to free speech and association.” 46 In
Tinker v. Des Moines, the landmark student free speech case, the
Supreme Court held that students do not “shed their constitutional
rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.” 47 In Healy v. James, the Supreme
Court noted that colleges, like secondary public education schools,
are not immune from the requirements of the First Amendment.48
The First Amendment, as applied to the states and state insti-
tutions via the Fourteenth Amendment, requires regulations that
proscribe conduct touching upon First Amendment freedoms to be
41. See Will W. Travelstead, Introduction and Historical Context, in ENHANCING
CAMPUS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 3, 3 (Robert Caruso & Will W. Travelstead eds., 1987)
(explaining that “[t]he prevailing doctrine . . . was one of judicial restraint”).
42. Id.
43. See Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 620 (D.P.R. 1973) (three judge panel)
(“It is . . . well settled that it is not the policy of the federal courts ‘[to] intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems.’ ” (citing
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))).
44. See Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 346 F. Supp. 470, 482 (D.P.R. 1972) (denying motion
to dismiss and convening three judge panel).
45. Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
46. Edgar H. Bittle et al., Due Process for Students, in SCHOOL VIOLENCE FROM
DISCIPLINE TO DUE PROCESS 99, 109 (James C. Hanks ed., 2004).
47. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
48. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (noting that “colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment”).
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specific in describing the prohibited conduct.49 First Amendment
freedoms are considered “most precious” 50 and “the government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” 51 The recognition
that students do not shed their constitutional rights, particularly
their First Amendment rights, while attending school requires that
student disciplinary regulations be sufficiently defined.52 These pro-
tections are not solely limited to public secondary schools, but extend
to college students as well.53
The recognition that students are entitled to constitutional pro-
tection was only the first question for courts to address when ana-
lyzing student disciplinary regulations. Courts were faced with the
additional question of how to enforce such protections given that stu-
dents do not possess the same level of First Amendment protection
as adults living in a free society.54 Courts are required to balance a
student’s First Amendment rights “against . . . society’s countervail-
ing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appro-
priate behavior.” 55 Courts were conflicted on whether to apply the
full force of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to student disciplinary
regulations or to apply some other standard of review.56 Over time,
however, courts have found that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does
“extend[ ] to rules regulating the conduct of students in educational
institutions chartered or supported by the state.” 57
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as applied to student disciplin-
ary regulations infringing on First Amendment freedoms, requires
precision in the regulation’s language to ensure that the regulation
49. See ROBERT E. PHAY, THE LAW OF PROCEDURE IN STUDENT SUSPENSIONS AND
EXPULSIONS 7 (1977) (noting that “courts are particularly firm in requiring specificity
when First Amendment freedoms are involved”).
50. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438 (1963).
51. Id. at 433.
52. See PAUL WECKSTEIN, SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND STUDENT RIGHTS 37 (rev. ed. 1982)
(indicating that “[i]n order to avoid violations of constitutional rights, precision in school
rules affecting expression is essential”).
53. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (explaining that there is “no room for the view that . . .
First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses”). It is
also important to note that “[p]rivate colleges and universities are not required to meet
the due process requirements applied to public institutions.” John Wesley Lowery &
Michael Dannells, Contemporary Practice in Student Judicial Affairs: Strengths and
Weaknesses, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS, supra note 3, at 16, 20.
54. See Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“It does not follow, however, that
simply because the use of a[ ] . . . form of expression may not be prohibited to adults . . .
the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school.”).
55. Id. at 681.
56. See, e.g., Undergraduate Student Ass’n v. Peltason, 367 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (noting the “sharp divergence as to the required degree of specificity” for student
conduct regulations that implicate First Amendment rights).
57. Sill v. Pa. State Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 1972) (citing Soglin v. Kauffman,
418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969)).
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does not inhibit the exercise of protected speech and applies only
to unprotected expression.58 Courts begin an examination of a stu-
dent disciplinary regulation by first “determin[ing] if the [regulation]
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.” 59
If the regulation is found to do so, courts will next consider whether
the regulation’s language “invites arbitrary, discriminatory and
overzealous enforcement.” 60 In conducting that review, courts must
balance a “school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions
for a wide range of unanticipated conduct” 61 with the need to give
students an “indication of what actions or behavior would lead to
discipline.” 62 As noted above, however, courts will invalidate a stu-
dent disciplinary regulation under the void-for-vagueness doctrine
if the regulation is not sufficiently clear to ensure the protection of
First Amendment freedoms.63
A recent area of challenges to student disciplinary regulations
involves student-on-student sexual harassment. With the passage of
Title IX,64 colleges are now required to “adopt and publish grievance
procedures for handling complaints of sexual harassment.” 65 In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has held that colleges can be held individu-
ally liable under Title IX.66 These two factors led to nearly all colleges
adopting a formal sexual harassment prohibition within their codes
58. WECKSTEIN, supra note 52, at 37.
59. Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d. 791, 801 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (citing
Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1995)).
60. Id. at 802 (quoting Leonardson v. City of East Lansing, 896 F.2d 190, 195-96 (6th
Cir. 1990)).
61. Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
62. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d. at 802.
63. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding
“obscene” is too vague); Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d. at 802 (finding “inappropriate” behavior
too vague); Note, supra note 18, at 1264-65 (noting that “a series of speaker bans [have]
been held unconstitutionally vague, [and] so have rules restricting student freedom to
assemble, to establish political organizations, and to determine the editorial content of
campus newspapers”).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . . .”).
65. JUDITH BERMAN BRANDENBURG, CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 23 (1997).
66. See CATHERINE HILL & ELENA SILVA, DRAWING THE LINE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ON CAMPUS 7 (2005), available at http://www.aauw.org/research/upload/DTLFinal.pdf
(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court affirmed in 1992 that sexual harassment is a form of
sex discrimination under Title IX when it ruled in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992), that students could seek monetary damages for sexual harass-
ment from educational institutions”). Title IX is not the sole avenue through which a
victim of gender discrimination can pursue his or her claim; the Supreme Court recently
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is also available. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129
S. Ct. 788, 796 (2009).
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of conduct.67 These student disciplinary regulations have become a
recent focus for void-for-vagueness challenges because the regulations
“could include ‘core’ political and religious speech, such as gender
politics and sexual morality.” 68 These recent judicial examinations
of student disciplinary regulations demonstrate that courts are now
more willing than ever to invalidate student disciplinary regulations
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
D. Student Disciplinary Regulations and General Due Process
Courts were even more reluctant to extend the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to student disciplinary regulations that did not implicate
First Amendment freedoms.69 This reluctance was based on the per-
ception that students did not face serious consequences, as a criminal
defendant would, from sanctions imposed under a student disciplinary
scheme.70 This reluctance was also based on the recognition, just as
in First Amendment cases, that colleges have a strong interest in pro-
tecting the educational environment.71 Courts eventually recognized,
however, that some procedural protections were needed in cases of
potentially serious sanctions.72
1. Student Disciplinary Procedures and Judicial Intervention
As courts became increasingly active in the protection of First
Amendment freedoms by invalidating student disciplinary regulations,
many courts remained reluctant to intervene to enforce due process
protections in cases that involved general conduct regulations absent
First Amendment concerns.73 Courts were simply unwilling to inter-
vene even in cases of expulsion or suspension because “the process
is not punitive or deterrent in the criminal law sense, but the process
67. See HILL & SILVA, supra note 66, at 33.
68. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Saxe v. State
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001)).
69. See Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1969)
(stating that the court will not require student proceedings to conform to
criminal proceedings).
70. See id. at 628 (noting that student proceedings are not equal to criminal proceed-
ings in an irrevocable expulsion case for misconduct).
71. See id. at 629 (finding that an educational institution can impose on its students
a standard of conduct “that is relevant to a lawful mission, process or function of the
educational institution”).
72. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) (“At the very minimum, therefore,
students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property
interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing.”).
73. See Esteban, 290 F.Supp. at 629 (upholding disciplinary action where regulation
did not deprive students of First Amendment rights).
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is rather the determination that the student is unqualified to con-
tinue as a member of the educational community.” 74 Some courts
even recognized the “damaging effects” of an expulsion, but found that
because the student could not be “imprisoned, fined, disenfranchised,
or subjected to probationary supervision,” student disciplinary pro-
ceedings could not be equated “to criminal proceedings against adults
and juveniles.” 75
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education marked a turning
point in the protection of students’ due process rights.76 In Dixon, the
court held that public university students have a constitutional right
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the
“constitutional right to notice and hearing before their suspension
or expulsion.” 77 In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court largely adopted
the Fifth Circuit’s rationale.78 Goss represents “the seminal case on
student due process” because the Supreme Court held that in cases
where a student is suspended for more than ten days, “minimal due
process — notice and an opportunity to be heard — [is] required.” 79
It is important to note that the Supreme Court in Goss found that
students had two different interests that necessitated due process
protection in student disciplinary proceedings.80 First, the high school
students challenging their suspensions had a property right arising
from a state law that required local authorities to provide public edu-
cation.81 Second, and relevant to this Note, the students possessed a
liberty interest arising under the Fourteenth Amendment because
their “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity [were] at stake.”82
2. Application of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine to Student
Disciplinary Regulations
Given the Supreme Court’s holding in Goss, courts began to hold
that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does apply to student disciplinary
74. Id. at 628.
75. Id.
76. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
77. Lowery & Dannells, supra note 53, at 20.
78. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (noting that a student’s interest is
not “so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure
the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary”).
79. Bittle et al., supra note 46, at 101.
80. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (noting a student’s right to public education as a
property interest and a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment).
81. Id.; see also WILLIAM D. VALENTE WITH CHRISTINA M. VALENTE, LAW IN THE
SCHOOLS 230 (5th ed. 2001) (“It is now settled that a student’s entitlement under state
law to a public education or to state-mandated educational benefits is a property interest
that entitles students who face educational penalties to due process.”).
82. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 437 (1971));
see also Bittle et al., supra note 46, at 103 (“The liberty interests protected by due
process include preserving one’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.”).
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regulations proscribing non-expressive conduct.83 Schools, colleges
in particular, attempted to push back against court intervention by
claiming that schools have “the inherent power . . . to discipline stu-
dents and that this power may be exercised without the necessity of
relying on a specific rule of conduct.” 84 Courts quickly pointed out,
however, that the “[p]ower to punish and the rules defining the exer-
cise of that power are not . . . identical.” 85 Although courts have long
recognized the unique responsibilities and challenges facing colleges,86
courts have also held that colleges are “not immune from the [ ] re-
quirements of due process.” 87
Courts have taken notice that many “outstanding educational
authorities in the field of higher education believe, on the basis of ex-
perience, that detailed codes of prohibited student conduct are pro-
vocative and should not be employed in higher education.” 88 Based
on this view and the balancing of interests the Court in Goss seemed
to articulate,89 courts have generally found that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, when applied to student disciplinary regulations, does “not
require . . . the same rigorous standards as criminal statutes.” 90
Given the history and development of judicial intervention into
student disciplinary regulations, four general parameters apply to
student disciplinary regulations. First, students are entitled to due
process protections in student disciplinary procedures and regula-
tions.91 Second, these protections include the right to be put on notice
of what conduct is proscribed.92 Third, as a matter of due process, stu-
dent disciplinary regulations proscribing certain conduct are subject
to the void-for-vagueness doctrine.93 Finally, the void-for-vagueness
83. See Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1969)
(“The constitutional doctrine[ ] of vagueness . . . [is] applicable, in some measure, to the
standard or standards to be applied by the university in disciplining its students . . . .”).
84. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969).
85. Id.
86. See Sullivan, 307 F. Supp. at 1347 (noting the “highly discretionary functions”
of school officials).
87. Soglin, 418 F.2d at 167.
88. Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 290 F. Supp. 622, 630 (W.D. Mo. 1968)
(citation omitted).
89. See Bittle et al., supra note 46, at 101 (“The clear rule is that ‘[t]he minimum
procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process depend upon the circum-
stances and the interests of the parties involved.’ Clearly, Goss v. Lopez . . . suggests
this flexible standard.”).
90. Soglin, 418 F.2d at 168; see also LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW & JERRY R. PARKINSON,
THE LAW OF STUDENT EXPULSIONS AND SUSPENSIONS 4 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that “the
exact form of [student] rules seems flexible”).
91. See Lowery & Dannells, supra note 53, at 20 (explaining that “the courts [have]
established constitutional protections for college students”).
92. See ROSSOW & PARKINSON, supra note 90, at 4 (“To exist, due process must meet
the requirement of notice.”).
93. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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doctrine, given the unique responsibilities and challenges facing col-
leges, is applied, depending on the constitutional rights at stake, in
a less rigid fashion than in other contexts.94 These parameters have
led courts to invalidate regulations proscribing “inappropriate” be-
havior,95 “misconduct,” 96 behavior not “promoting [the school’s] best
interests,” 97 “improper or disrespectful conduct,” 98 and student dress
that is not “expected” 99 under a void-for-vagueness application that
is deferential to colleges.100
II. APPLICATION OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
TO STUDENT DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS PROSCRIBING
SEXUAL ASSAULT
A recent survey101 found that 33.2% of schools used only a generic
term such as “sexual assault” or “sexual misconduct” in their student
disciplinary regulations without further defining the specific acts
94. See Soglin, 418 F.2d at 168 (noting that the court “[does] not require university
codes of conduct to satisfy the same rigorous standards as criminal statutes”); see also
ROSSOW & PARKINSON, supra note 90, at 4 (explaining that “the exact form of the rules
seems flexible”). But see PHAY, supra note 49, at 7 (noting that there may be less strict
requirements when the First Amendment freedoms are not involved in the conduct).
95. See Coy ex rel. Cox v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d. 791, 802 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(explaining “[t]he section does not define ‘inappropriate’ or give any indication to students
what activity might be inappropriate. On its face, the wording . . . ‘invites arbitrary,
discriminatory and overzealous enforcement.’ ”) (citing Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ.,
55 F.3d 1177, 1183 (6th Cir. 1995)).
96. Soglin, 418 F.2d at 168 (“The use of ‘misconduct’ as a standard in imposing the
penalties threatened here must . . . fall for vagueness. The inadequacy of the rule is
apparent on its face.”).
97. Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1345-46 (S.D. Tex.
1969) (“Little can be said of a standard so grossly overbroad as ‘in the best interests of
the school.’ It cannot be contended that it supplies objective standards by which a
student may measure his behavior or by which an administrator may make a specific
ruling in evaluation of behavior.”) (citation omitted).
98. Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 627 (D.P.R. 1973) (three judge panel)
(“The inadequacy is obvious — the purpose of a prohibitory rule is to inform those affected
what is improper not merely that the ‘improper’ is prohibited.”).
99. See Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114, 117-18 (D. Conn. 1970) (“The wordage of
the school code in stating what is ‘expected’ is too vague . . . [i]t leaves to the arbitrary
whim of the school principal, what in fact constitutes extreme fashion or style in the
matter of personal grooming and permits his own subjective opinion . . . .”).
100. See WECKSTEIN, supra note 52, at 203 (noting that Crossen, Soglin, and Sullivan
involved regulations invalidated “without resorting to the higher standards applicable
to First Amendment/chilling effect grounds (even though the students in both Soglin
and Sullivan were engaged in expressive activities)”). The “higher standard” void-for-
vagueness application more closely examines student disciplinary regulations and
requires more specificity in order to protect First Amendment activities. See PHAY, supra
note 49, at 7 (noting that “courts are particularly firm in requiring specificity when
First Amendment freedoms are involved”).
101. The survey consisted of 2,438 schools throughout the United States and Puerto
Rico, including all ninety-eight historically black colleges and universities, all twenty-eight 
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that violated the regulation.102 The survey found that even of those
schools that further defined what acts constituted sexual assault,
sixty-two percent included the vague term “sexual contact” in the
definition of sexual assault contained in the regulation.103 This sur-
vey shows that “there are no standard definitions of rape and sexual
assault” and that “the ways in which rape and sexual assault are
defined varies across institutions and states.”104 The use of various
definitions illustrates the confusion regarding what acts constitute
sexual assault. This confusion leads to the perpetuation of “rape
myths”105 and creates a void where students themselves set the stan-
dard of what constitutes acceptable sexual behavior.106 These vague
regulations also fail to address a major factor in sexual contact be-
tween college students: alcohol.107 The failure to adequately define
what acts violate the regulation proscribing sexual assault creates
three substantial issues about which students, parents, and admin-
istrators should be concerned. First, the regulation’s vagueness can
give rise to legal challenges by the accused based on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. Second, the regulation’s vagueness creates a
vacuum in which students are able to develop their own standard
of appropriate sexual behavior that condones the very acts the
college wishes to prevent. Third, the regulation’s vagueness creates
confusion resulting in many survivors being unsure of whether or
not the acts they were subject to constituted sexual assault, thus
leading to significant underreporting of sexual assaults.
Native American tribal schools, and two-to-four-year private and public colleges and
universities. KARJANE ET AL., supra note 6, at vi.
102. Id. at 44, 46 tbl.3.3.
103. Id.
104. Id. at viii.
105. See CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE
PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION 38 (1993) (noting the myth of a “real rape” to be one in
which “a victim is raped by a stranger who jumps out of the bushes with a weapon”); see
also CAMPUS COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 87 (indicating the common perception that
“real rape” is “committed by a stranger hiding behind a bush”).
106. See Mary Crawford & Danielle Popp, Sexual Double Standards: A Review and
Methodological Critique of Two Decades of Research, 40 J. SEX RES. 13, 17 (2003) (noting
one study that suggested age “is important when evaluating sexual standards”); see also
BOGLE, supra note 14, at 72-95 (suggesting that college students’ perceptions of appro-
priate sexual behavior is shaped by their peer group); Gwendell W. Gravitt, Jr. & Mary M.
Krueger, College Students’ Perceptions of the Relationship Between Sex and Drinking,
in SEXUAL HARASSMENT & SEXUAL CONSENT 175, 184 (Barry M. Dank & Roberto Refinetti
eds., 1998) (noting that students “learn the dynamics of the sexual uses of alcohol . . .
primarily by watching, and being subject to social pressures by their peers”).
107. See DeJong, supra note 3, at 104 (noting that “approximately 400,000 students
each year have unprotected sex due to their use of alcohol, while more than 100,000
students are too intoxicated to know whether they consented to sexual intercourse” and
that twenty percent of respondents in one survey “said they had experienced an un-
wanted sexual advance due to someone else’s drinking”).
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A. Vague Terms
As discussed in Part I.D.1, absent an implication of First Amend-
ment freedoms, courts are reluctant to apply the full strength of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine to student disciplinary regulations.108
Courts are generally willing to uphold “terms that are customarily
understood, such as willful disobedience, intentional disruption . . .
profanity, excessive absenteeism, and vulgarity.”109 This approach,
however, presents a unique problem in defining sexual assault within
a student disciplinary regulation because college students often have
significantly different views of what constitutes inappropriate sex-
ual contact, particularly given the integral role alcohol plays in the
campus culture, than do administrators, parents, and adults in so-
ciety.110 Colleges failing to fully define what acts constitute sexual
assault under the regulation provide an opportunity for the accused
to challenge the regulation under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
The realities of campus social norms, particularly the regular use of
alcohol, must also be taken into account when drafting the student
disciplinary regulation.
1. Student Perception of What Constitutes Sexual Assault
More precise wording of a student disciplinary regulation pro-
hibiting sexual assault is necessary to ensure that students fully
understand what acts are prohibited. As noted above, nearly one-
third of colleges in a recent survey used only a generic term such as
“sexual assault” or “sexual offense” within their code of conduct
without further defining specific prohibited acts.111 Of those schools
that did include specific behavior, nearly all defined sexual assault
to include penile-vaginal rape (93.4%), over half included acquain-
tance rape (53.4%), and a little over forty percent included anal or oral
penetration (45.8%) or other forms of vaginal penetration (43%).112
The survey, however, also found that 62% of colleges that further
defined sexual assault included the generic term “sexual contact”113
108. See PHAY, supra note 49, at 7 (noting that “[w]hen the conduct does not involve
the expression of First Amendment freedoms, however, less strict requirements may
be imposed”).
109. VALENTE WITH VALENTE, supra note 81, at 232.
110. BOGLE, supra note 14, at 28 (noting “that there may be generational differences
in perceptions of what counts as sex”); see also Associated Press, Americans Aren’t Explicit
When Defining Sex, MSNBC, July 1, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31685784/ns/
health-sexual_health/.
111. KARJANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 46 tbl.3.3.
112. Id.
113. See id. (noting that sexual contact also included “unwanted touching of intimate
body parts”).
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and 28.4% of colleges included other acts such as “voyeurism, inde-
cent exposure, nondisclosure of HIV/STDs, and forms of homosexual
behavior.”114 The failure to adequately define what acts constitute
sexual assault results in administrators believing acts A, B, and C115
are prohibited by the regulation and students believing only act A
is prohibited.116 This is particularly true where the administrators’
understanding of the regulation includes acts that do not consist of
actual physical contact such as voyeurism.117 Researchers have noted
the disparity in understanding what behavior constitutes sexual
assault even amongst researchers themselves.118 One critic of the
prevailing view argues that the prevailing view “cast[s] a large, tightly-
woven net that snares the minnows with the sharks.”119
Colleges are justified in prohibiting sexual acts beyond forcible
rape under a student disciplinary regulation proscribing sexual assault
in order to “incorporate a more complete range of sexual behaviors
that many [survivors] regard as major threats to their physical and
psychological well-being.”120 The institutional definition, however,
must be clear enough to put students on notice of exactly what acts
are prohibited in order to avoid legal challenges under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.121 Given the disparity that often exists between
the college’s understanding and students’ understanding of what con-
stitutes sexual assault, it is important to specifically define what acts
violate the regulation.122 Further defining sexual assault with specific
acts is necessary to put students on notice of what acts constitute
sexual assault.123 If a college wishes to prohibit more than penile-
vaginal rape, proscribing “sexual assault” does not put students on
notice of what is prohibited, because students largely believe that
114. Id.
115. See SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 8 (noting that some use the
term “sexual assault to depict a broader range of behaviors ranging from nonconsensual
kissing to nonconsensual anal, oral, and vaginal intercourse”).
116. See KARJANE ET AL., supra note 6, at vii (noting that “when weapons are absent,
alcohol is present, and/or physical injury . . . is not apparent” students do not perceive
the incident to be sexual assault).
117. Id. at 46 tbl.3.3 (indicating that 28.4% of colleges include behaviors that do not
consist of actual contact between the accused and survivor, such as voyeurism, within
their definition of sexual assault).
118. SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 8-9 (noting that the prevailing view
defines sexual assault to include unwanted sex play, i.e., fondling, kissing, or petting,
in addition to sexual coercion, attempted rape, and rape).
119. Id. at 26.
120. Id. at 8.
121. See CAMPUS COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 31 (noting the need to “address, in
detail, issues of expected and proscribed student conduct”).
122. Id.
123. See id. at 3 (noting that students “are not likely to change their behaviors, values
and attitudes until they examine and label” these behaviors as sexual assault).
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sexual assault only includes forcible penile-vaginal penetration by
a stranger.124 This perception, recognized by those colleges that spe-
cifically include other forms of vaginal penetration in their definition
of sexual assault, does not include vaginal penetration with something
other than a penis (mouth, tongue, fingers, and/or foreign objects) nor
does it include anal or oral penetration.125 The perception of “real
rape” is even more troubling given the high rate of acquaintance rape
on college campuses,126 because “acquaintance sexual assaults con-
tain few, if any, of” the perceived elements of “real rape.”127
The problem is not that colleges wish to prohibit conduct under
a student disciplinary regulation proscribing sexual assault that is
broader than forcible rape; rather, the problem is that students are
simply not put on notice of that expansion. The failure to provide ade-
quate notice to students of what acts are prohibited by the regulation
provides a justification under the first lens of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, discussed in Part I.A, to invalidate the student disciplinary
regulation.128 Additionally, the failure to provide a more detailed expla-
nation of what acts are prohibited may invite arbitrary or discrimina-
tory enforcement by campus administrators, giving further support to
a challenge under the second lens of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.129
2. Alcohol
It is no secret that the college culture is dominated by regular
and often excessive alcohol consumption.130 This culture of heavy
124. BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 105, at 138.
125. See KARJANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 45 (noting that less than fifty percent of
colleges include other forms of penetration in their definitions of sexual assault).
126. See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 105, at 26 (noting that acquaintance rape is
the most common type of sexual assault on college campuses); see also NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 2 (indicating that “between [eighty] and [ninety] percent” of
sexual assaults involving college students can be labeled acquaintance rape).
127. BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 105, at 38; see also LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS AN ETHICAL ISSUE IN ACADEMIC LIFE 69 (2001) (noting “[t]here
is an extensive literature about whether acquaintance or date rape is similar to such
‘real’ rape”); Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 153 (noting that “[d]ate rape or acquaintance
rape is reported even less frequently than other forms of sexual assault because few
persons identify it as a crime”).
128. See ROSSOW & PARKINSON, supra note 90, at 4 (noting that a “clearly understood
school rule must forewarn the student that certain behavior” is prohibited); Bittle, supra
note 46, at 105 (noting that due process requires that “[t]he rules must be sufficiently
definite to provide prior notice to students . . . that certain standards of conduct, behavior,
and performance are expected”); see also supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
129. See SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 157 (noting one benefit of a clear
regulation is that “everyone at the university in positions of authority [is] acting in the
same way, based on the same set of presumptions”).
130. See Gravitt & Krueger, supra note 106, at 179 (noting that “[f]ifty-eight of the
[sixty] subjects reported that consumption of alcohol in social situations is the norm on
campus”).
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alcohol consumption impacts many areas of college administration,
but is particularly relevant for student disciplinary regulations pro-
scribing sexual assault.131 Some studies have shown a direct causal
link between alcohol and sexual aggression,132 while others have
argued that “the physiological effects of alcohol increase the likeli-
hood that men will commit a sexually aggressive act.”133 While there
is significant disagreement about the existence of a direct causal link
between alcohol and sexual assault,134 there is near universal accep-
tance “that alcohol . . . plays some important role.”135 The connection
between alcohol and sexual behavior is not always sinister — that
is, when the perpetrator uses “alcohol as a weapon to get [another
individual] to engage in sexual intercourse [he or she] do[es] not
want”136 — but also involves situations where the perpetrator uses
alcohol to build up their own confidence when dealing with a member
of the opposite sex.137
Colleges face the added pressure of not appearing to condone
underage or excessive drinking and thus colleges inundate students
with a message that says “don’t drink.”138 This unfortunately creates
131. See id. at 175 (noting “the tendency of young adults to combine . . . alcohol . . .
with sexual behavior”).
132. See id. at 176 (explaining the common “assumption that the mere presence of
alcohol in social situations is a causal factor — a catalyst — for sexual violence and unsafe
sexual behavior”); see also SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 105 (noting a
study that argued “alcohol was a factor for [sixty-six percent] of the date rapists”).
133. SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 105.
134. See id. at 105-06 (explaining the disagreements amongst researchers regarding
the strength of the link between sexual assault and alcohol).
135. Id. at 106; see also BOGLE, supra note 14, at 167 (noting that “[t]he connection
between hooking up and alcohol-centered socializing on campus is not insignificant”).
136. SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 107.
137. See Gravitt & Krueger, supra note 106, at 179 (noting a study that showed fifty-
eight out of sixty students “indicated that their peers explicitly use alcohol to facilitate
casual sexual encounters known as ‘hooking up.’ ”); see also BOGLE, supra note 14, at 168
(indicating that consuming alcohol can help nervous students navigate the complex college
dating scene).
138. See Gravitt & Krueger, supra note 106, at 176 (explaining that a college’s mes-
sage to students is often simply “don’t drink”); see also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF
HIGHER EDUCATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION MAKING 60-61 (2d ed. 1985) (noting “student alcohol abuse is increasingly recog-
nized as a serious campus problem, and special efforts are being made to eradicate it”);
TERRY W. MCCARTHY & DONALD D. GEHRING, 1999 UPDATE TO ALCOHOL ON CAMPUS: A
COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW AND A GUIDE TO CAMPUS POLICY 251 (1999) (noting the passage
of federal law mandating “a biennial review to determine the effectiveness of the insti-
tution’s programs to reduce the use, possession and distribution of alcohol” and legis-
lation that, though not a legal mandate, was “very intrusive and suggest[ed] that [college]
presidents establish and support task forces to examine academic life and recommend
changes to reduce alcohol . . . problems . . . and . . . also suggests alcohol free housing
and other alcohol free environments as well as a zero tolerance policy for illegal con-
sumption and the vigorous enforcement of campus policies”).
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a void in programming and education in which students are provided
“with little information or skills regarding how to negotiate social
and sexual situations involving alcohol.”139 This lack of information
and skills leads to troubling results with students having a dangerous
perception of alcohol and sexual behavior. One study of college stu-
dents indicated that more than seventy-five percent of students relied
“heavily on alcohol as a tool with which to manipulate social inter-
actions to produce sexual activity.”140 This manipulation is used to
“facilitate casual sexual encounters known as ‘hooking up’ ”141 or to
manufacture an excuse to engage in sexual behavior that they nor-
mally would not.142 A troubling consequence of this culture is the
fostering of an environment that encourages women to “use alcohol in
order to give themselves a ‘safe’ excuse to engage in sexual activity”
to avoid the negative labels associated with a female being sexually
active.143 Another troubling aspect of alcohol use by students is the
perception by men that “females bear the ultimate responsibility for
preventing” any inappropriate sexual behavior.144
This is not to say that students should be given a free pass when
it comes to their behavior while under the influence of alcohol. On
the contrary, students need to be put on notice that alcohol cannot
serve as an excuse and that students need to be more self-aware about
their actions, particularly their sexual behavior, while under the in-
fluence of alcohol. The point is that college administrators must face
reality.145 Students are attempting to navigate the confusing and
stressful college social scene and predominantly rely on their peers
to determine the norms of sexual behavior.146 This reliance leads to the
adoption of a behavioral norm that accepts and encourages alcohol
as a necessary element in the campus social scene, particularly when
139. Gravitt & Krueger, supra note 106, at 176.
140. Id. at 179.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 179-80.
143. Id. at 180.
144. See BOGLE, supra note 14, at 180 (noting that many students “took for granted
that it is a woman’s responsibility to decide ‘how far’ a sexual encounter will go”); Gravitt
& Krueger, supra note 106, at 181 (noting the general feeling among the survey’s
participants that “girls . . . know what they want; [if] they don’t want sex, they won’t get
hammered and put themselves in that situation,” and if females are “worried about
violence, they need to . . . not get plastered”).
145. See BOGLE, supra note 14, at 185 (explaining that incidents of sexual assault
develop “out of a larger context of how students socialize” and that “[w]ithout under-
standing this context, it [is] difficult to find any effective solutions”).
146. See id. at 95 (explaining that “[i]n the campus sexual arena, students create
their personal standards by drawing upon what they believe other students are doing
(i.e., what is ‘normal’)”).
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it comes to sexual behavior.147 Add in alcohol, a “hookup culture,”148
and a college’s failure to adequately define what constitutes sexual
assault and one has a recipe for disaster.
B. Policy Reasons
Aside from the legal concerns, there are also serious policy con-
cerns that weigh in favor of drafting more specific student disciplinary
regulations proscribing sexual assault. The stigma that attaches to
a student based upon a finding that he or she violated the sexual
assault student disciplinary regulation has potentially significant
negative consequences for that student.149 Eliminating vagueness
in the student disciplinary regulation will also assist survivors of
sexual assault in understanding that the behavior they were sub-
jected to was wrong and should be reported.150 Ensuring that all acts
of sexual assault are reported to the appropriate officials will not only
ensure the safety of the entire college community, but will also ensure
that the survivor is provided the necessary support and resources to
cope with the trauma.151
1. Stigma
Disciplinary action against a student under a student disci-
plinary regulation proscribing sexual assault becomes part of that
student’s educational record.152 Courts have recognized the greater
consequences of student disciplinary action, specifically noting that
the “potential consequences reach beyond [a student’s] immediate
standing at the [college].”153 This concern is amplified in the case of
sexual assault and could “have a major immediate and life-long
147. See Gravitt & Krueger, supra note 106, at 185 (noting that “not only do many
college students use alcohol as an excuse for sexual behaviors that they would not engage
in while sober . . . but also that they are aware they are doing so”).
148. See BOGLE, supra note 14, at 50-71 (discussing the current state of sex, dating,
and relationships on college campuses).
149. See Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1338 (S.D. Tex. 1969)
(noting that the disciplinary action taken against a student “amounts to a blot on [his
or her] scholastic records that might well haunt [him or her] for years to come”).
150. See SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 91 (noting that “the problem of
the hidden victim is particularly strong, in that [one] must first deal with the issue of
whether [one is] in fact a victim at all”).
151. See id. at 91-92 (noting the need for survivors to seek help for “their emotional
and psychological reactions to victimization”).
152. See United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 812 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
“student disciplinary records are education records because they directly relate to a
student and are kept by that student’s university”).
153. Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D. Me. 2005).
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impact on [the student’s] personal life, education, employment, and
public engagement.”154
Given this serious concern and the ability of colleges to develop
regulations proscribing all types of conduct, the definition of sexual
assault should only include the most serious types of inappropriate
sexual acts, specifically excluding activities that do not involve physical
contact between the perpetrator and the survivor, and specifically
identifying what type of contact is prohibited. A regulation that in-
cludes too broad of a range of behaviors will “cast a large, tightly-
woven net that snares the minnows with the sharks.”155 Under such
a broad regulation, a student who tries to peer into the sorority house
showers through an open window (i.e., voyeurism) will be charged with
the same violation as a student who violently beats and forcibly rapes
another student. To be clear, both acts should be prohibited by the
college given the “major threat[ ] to [a survivor’s] physical and psycho-
logical well-being,” but the behaviors should be dealt with under dif-
ferent regulations.156 This will ensure that the full negative weight
of a sexual assault violation is counter-balanced by the equally, if not
greater, morally culpable behavior.
2. Underreporting
Study after study has shown that sexual assault is significantly
underreported on college campuses.157 Vagueness in a student disci-
plinary regulation proscribing sexual assault not only fails to put the
perpetrator on notice of what behavior is prohibited, but also results
in many survivors failing to label the experience as sexual assault.158
Vagueness in the student disciplinary regulation is not the only rea-
son survivors fail to report the incident,159 but any action a college is
154. Id. (citation omitted).
155. SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 26.
156. Id. at 8. But see id. at 8 (noting activists’ concerns “that narrow definitions of
sexual assault . . . ignore many [victim’s] subjective experiences of sexual assault or create
a hierarchy of sexual victimization based on seriousness”).
157. See SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 89 (explaining that “a very
small number of women report their assaults . . . so any counts we have are extraordi-
narily low”); Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 152 (noting one report that found “that only
33.6% of campus sexual assaults were reported to the police”).
158. See SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 89 (noting that one study found
that “only [twenty-seven percent] of women said they had been raped, even though they
all described a victimization experience that completely fulfilled the state law for rape”);
see also Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 153 (explaining that “acquaintance rape is reported
even less frequently than other forms of sexual assault because few persons identify it
as a crime”).
159. See Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 153 (indicating that survivors often fail to report
the incident due to “the perceived stigma, and the belief that no purpose would be served”
by the incident).
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able to take to ensure that more survivors report incidents of sexual
assault is a step in the right direction.
The failure to label the experience as sexual assault is in large
part tied to alcohol use.160 One particular area in which vagueness
must be eliminated within any regulation proscribing sexual assault
concerns the ability of a student to consent to sexual conduct. It is
vitally important that any student disciplinary regulation proscribing
sexual assault be explicitly clear that an intoxicated student is un-
able to give consent to sexual acts. This is important given the domi-
nance of alcohol within the social culture on college campuses161 and
the resulting feeling among many survivors that it is the survivor’s
“fault for getting drunk, not [the perpetrator’s] fault for committing”
sexual assault.162 A clear rule that indicates that an individual is un-
able to give consent when intoxicated, but that the perpetrator is still
liable for his or her actions, will serve a strong deterrent effect on
college campuses.163
There is, however, significant criticism of this position, arguing
that it is fundamentally unfair to hold only one party liable for one’s
actions while intoxicated.164 Critics of such a clear rule also point to
the research that shows that alcohol is often used by both men and
women “to ‘get into the mood’ for legitimate sexual interactions.”165
Supporters of this clear rule, however, point to the overwhelming
amount of evidence that shows the significant role alcohol plays in
sexual assaults on college campuses, particularly in acquaintance
rape.166 Supporters also point to the difficulty of drafting and enforc-
ing a regulation that tries to establish a moving standard of intoxi-
cated consent.167 Given the strong interests at stake on a college
160. See DeJong, supra note 3, at 104 (noting that “more than 100,000 students are
too intoxicated to know whether they consented to sexual intercourse”).
161. See Gravitt & Krueger, supra note 106, at 179 (noting that “[f]ifty-eight of the
[sixty] subjects reported that consumption of alcohol in social situations is the norm on
campus”).
162. SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 90.
163. See JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?: ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING WOMEN’S
CONSENT SERIOUSLY 153 (2005) (noting the strong incentive to avoid the behavior of
becoming intoxicated and having nonconsensual sex if there was a clear rule that an
intoxicated individual lacks consent).
164. See id. at 152 (noting the “inconsistency about not holding the drunken [survivor]
responsible for [one’s] drunkenness and what it leads to, while the drunken [perpetrator]
is held” liable for his or her behavior).
165. Id. at 147.
166. See id. (indicating that one study showed that “[seventy-five] percent of the men
and [fifty-five] percent of the women reported that they had consumed drugs or alcohol
prior to the [sexual assault]”).
167. See id. at 150 (noting that “it is difficult to state in abstract terms when a person
has had too much to drink . . . to consent”); id. at 154 (noting that making the survivor
“responsible for inebriated consent is . . . horribly out of line with the law’s treatment
of consent in other areas”).
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campus, particularly with a student disciplinary regulation proscrib-
ing sexual assault, colleges should err on the side of clarity and create
a bright-line rule.
III. PROPOSED STUDENT DISCIPLINARY REGULATION
Colleges must do a better job of defining which acts violate the
student disciplinary regulation proscribing sexual assault. The regu-
lation should “provide definitions sufficiently broad to capture the
scope of the problem, but specific enough to describe” what acts are
prohibited.168 The regulation should be written as plainly as possible
in not overly legalistic language to ensure students understand the
regulation.169 Finally, the regulation must address the realities of the
campus social scene and create a bright-line rule regarding the ability
to consent to sexual acts while under the influence of alcohol.
A. Avoid Legalistic Language
Providing a clearer definition of what constitutes sexual assault
within a student disciplinary regulation does not necessarily mean
that such a definition must become overly legalistic. Student disci-
plinary regulations are meant to be understood by students and should
be written in a manner easily understood by students.170 Student
judicial affairs professionals are justified in their concern regarding
language of a student disciplinary regulation as being too legalistic.171
Providing a clearer definition of sexual assault, however, will not
undermine the educational focus of student judicial affairs;172 it will
strengthen it by clearly indicating what conduct is prohibited.173
168. BRANDENBURG, supra note 65, at 51.
169. See WECKSTEIN, supra note 52, at 197 (indicating that “the vocabulary and style”
of the regulation is important to determine “the extent to which [the regulation] is reason-
ably designed to inform students of what is prohibited”).
170. Id.
171. See Lowery & Dannells, supra note 53, at 21 (noting that many “student judicial
affairs [professionals] continue to call for simpler, less legalistic” student disciplinary
regulations).
172. See id. (noting that concern that overly legalistic student disciplinary regulations
will undermine the education focus); see also BRETT A. SOKOLOW, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR
HIGHER EDUC. RISK MGMT., 2004 WHITE PAPER: CRAFTING A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY COLLEGE 4, available at http://www.ncherm.org/pdfs/Whitepaper
%20Crafting%20a%20Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf (indicating that “[t]he more legalistic
[student disciplinary regulations], the less developmental and educational they will be”).
173. See CAMPUS COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that students “are not likely
to change their behaviors, values and attitudes until they examine and label” these
behaviors as sexual assault).
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B. Proposed Language
Given the aforementioned, this Note proposes that campus
administrators adopt the following definition of sexual assault within
their student disciplinary regulations:
Sexual Assault — includes sexual intercourse, other sexual
acts (anal or oral intercourse or penetration by objects other than
the penis), and the intentional touching of another person’s gen-
itals or breasts, without the consent of the other person. An in-
dividual under the influence of alcohol is unable to consent to
sexual activity.
1. Clearly Indicate Acts
This definition removes any vagueness regarding what acts
actually constitute sexual assault and “incorporate[s] a more com-
plete range of sexual behaviors that many [survivors] regard as major
threats to their physical and psychological well-being.”174 Clearly
identifying behaviors beyond forcible rape as sexual assault will also
help eliminate myths about sexual assault.175 The elimination of such
myths will assist more survivors, particularly those of the most com-
mon form of sexual assault on college campuses,176 in recognizing their
victimization.177 This recognition is necessary to ensure that survivors
report the assault and receive the necessary support.178
2. Alcohol and Inability to Consent
The bright-line rule that clearly informs all students that an
individual under the influence of alcohol is unable to consent will
eliminate the perception that using alcohol to manipulate a social
setting to produce sexual activity is appropriate.179 Achieving the
174. SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 8.
175. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
176. See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 105, at 26 (noting that acquaintance rape is
the most common type of sexual assault on college campuses).
177. Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 153 (noting that “[d]ate rape or acquaintance rape
is reported even less frequently than other forms of sexual assault because few persons
identify it as a crime”).
178. See SCHWARTZ & DEKESEREDY, supra note 10, at 91-92 (noting the need for sur-
vivors to seek help for “their emotional and psychological reactions to victimization”).
179. See Gravitt & Krueger, supra note 106, at 179 (noting that more than seventy-
five percent of students relied “heavily on alcohol as a tool with which to manipulate social
interactions to produce sexual activity”).
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recognition that this behavior is inappropriate and labeling it as
such will help prevent future acts of sexual assault.180
CONCLUSION
Student disciplinary regulations are largely designed to “prevent
exploitation . . . and harm.”181 But in order to achieve this goal, these
regulations must “address, in detail, issues of expected and proscribed
student conduct.”182 Unfortunately, in the area of sexual assault,
most colleges are failing to adequately define what acts constitute
a violation of the regulation.183 The failure to adequately define what
constitutes a violation creates both a legal and a policy problem for
administrators. First, an accused student may challenge the regula-
tion under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.184 Second, the vagueness
may actually act as a barrier to the reporting of incidents of sexual
assault185 and may also do nothing to prevent future acts of assault.186
Administrators have noted the difficulty of writing a policy that
“is realistic, workable, and legal.”187 These concerns are at the heart
of the sexual assault definition proposed by this Note. First, the defi-
nition is legal. By providing a clear definition of prohibited behavior
and avoiding ambiguity, the regulation would survive a legal chal-
lenge under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Second, the definition
is workable. The proposed definition is written in clear non-legalistic
language and includes a bright-line, workable, standard by which to
judge consent. Finally, the proposed definition is realistic. It takes
into account the heavy role alcohol plays in college social settings and
includes a broader range of behaviors to eliminate the perception that
only forcible rape constitutes sexual assault.
Sexual assault is one of the most serious incidents that colleges
must address on their campuses.188 Studies have shown that around
180. See CAMPUS COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that perpetrators will not
change their behavior until “they examine and label [those behaviors] as aggressive and
violent”).
181. David A. Hoekema, CAMPUS RULES AND MORAL COMMUNITY: IN PLACE OF IN LOCO
PARENTIS 118 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 1994) [hereinafter CAMPUS RULES] (emphasis omitted).
182. CAMPUS COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 31.
183. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
184. See cases cited supra note 22.
185. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
186. See BOGLE, supra note 14, at 163 (noting that “[w]ith no firm guidelines decreeing
when, where, and with whom sex is appropriate, some students can engage in lewd
behavior and think it’s permissible because there are no rules saying otherwise”).
187. CAMPUS RULES, supra note 181, at 49.
188. See Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 151 (noting that sexual assault is “acknowledged
as the most common violent crime on U.S. college and university campuses”).
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one-quarter of college-aged women report being victims of sexual
assault;189 this number is probably lower than the actual occurrence
rate.190 While more precisely defining what actually constitutes sex-
ual assault will not completely solve the problem and will not prevent
all incidents of sexual assault, providing clear guidance to students
about what constitutes sexual assault is necessary as a legal and
policy matter.
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